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Introduction 
The effects of commodity policies and agricultural research expenditures on econonuc 
efficiency and income distribution have been widely analyzed in the literature. Commodity policies 
have helped farmers in industrial countries (and consumers in developing countries) at great costs to 
economic efficiency and huge distortions in world markets (OECD, Johnson, Sumner, Gardner 1987a, 
Tyers and Anderson, WDR). At the same time, public research investments are an important source of 
productivity growth in agriculture (Huffinan and Evenson (1992, 1993); Ruttan, Alston, Pardey and 
Norton). 1 Despite the overwhelming evidence of high social rates of return to public research 
investments, significant underinvestment persists in both developing countries and industrial countries. 
An important political economy literature has emerged trying to explain the pervasiveness of inefficient 
commodity policy world-wide and why political incentives induce governments to do as they do 
(Schultz (1978), Gardner (1987b), Krueger, Schiff and Valdes; de Gorter and Tsur; Swinnen; Lindert; 
Anderson and Hayami; de Janvry). 
In contrast, most of the explanations for sub-optimal public research investment has focused on 
economic rather than political factors. Explanations include imperfect information of governments, 
difficulties in overcoming the particular nature of the "publicness" of research (transaction costs), free 
rider problems and spill-ins between countries (or states within a country). Others have claimed that 
underinvestment may be overstated because studies ignore deadweight costs of taxation, the country's 
­
1	 Stiglitz (1993) states that the productivity increases induced by public research investments in agriculture have 
been "little short ofan economic miracle". . 
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trade position, terms of trade, the difference between intermediate and finished products, the effects on 
unemployment, private research effects, and the impact of public research on deadweight costs of 
commodity policies (Alston, Edwards and Freebaim; Edwards and Freebaim; Fox; Murphy, Furtan and 
Schmitz; Schmitz and Seckler; USDA). 
The objective of this paper is to develop a general political economic model that explains the 
stylized facts on redistribution through commodity policy and underinvestment in agricultural public 
research. While public investment in agricultural research has contributed importantly to economic 
growth, an important aspect of public research expenditures has been its impact on the distribution of 
income between urban and rural sectors (Cochrane,; Ruttan; de Gorter and Zilberman). Rausser and de 
Gorter, Nielson and Rausser argue that the political forces affecting commodity policy should therefore 
also be relevant for public investment policy. This literature also emphasizes the role commodity 
policies plays in mitigating the distributional effects of research and the importance of an integrated 
framework for policy analysis. 
To account for the distribution effects of both commodity policies and public research, we 
specify a model of two sectors with competing interests: a rural (agricultural) and an urban (industry) 
sector. Our framework has commodity policy and public research investment determined jointly. We 
assume that the policy combination is determined by rational choice, given the political constraints of 
the government. More specifically, we extend the public choice model of Swinnen and de Gorter 
(1993) and Swinnen by introducing public research investment as a second policy. This approach 
assumes that governments maximize political support and that this political support is a concave and 
increasing function of policy-induced changes in welfare. These, in tum, depend on the structure of the 
­
economy and specific policy. This approach ensures a stable and unique equilibrium within a two­
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policy framework and allows for comparative static analyses to derive the impact of structural changes 
in the economy which coincide with economic development. 
The joint determination of commodity policy and public research investment generates two 
types of "interaction effects". Public investment such as productivity increasing research can affect the 
deadweight costs of commodity policy.2 We define this as the "economic interaction effect (EIE)" as 
the change in deadweight costs per unit of transfer induced by the public research investment. There is 
another interaction effect between policies through how politicians make decisions with respect to 
changes in political support levels. Each policy affects the political support for the other policy, and so 
there is an incentive for politicians to change the level of the other policy. We will call this the 
"political interaction effect (pIE)". For example a change in research investment will affect the 
politically optimal commodity policy through its effect on the marginal political support levels, and, 
vice versa. Both interaction effects influence the politically optimal policy combination. 
The paper first presents a two sector-two policy model and then derives the social and political 
optimal policy combinations. In the following sections the impact of economic development on the 
optimal policy combinations is derived. The last section discusses implication of our analysis for the 
general literature on endogenous growth. 
The Model 
Consider an economy with 2 sectors: agriculture (sector A) and industry (sector B). All 
individuals in the economy have identical preferences and maximize an indirect utility function U(yi), 
where .; represents net income of individual i. Each sector has one representative individual with a 
-

We ignore the important issue why redistribution takes place through distortionary commodity policies and not 
through lump-sum transfers. Foster and Rausser (1993) show that price and trade policies can be a 
preferred policy to lump sum transfers when redistribution is used to reduce opposition to growth promoting 
policies by selectively compensating for adverse income effects. 
2 
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pre-policy 'endowment' income ie(for i = A, B). The government has two policy instruments affecting 
incomes in the economy: public agricultural research investment (pARI) and redistribution through 
commodity policies. While PARI is typically considered a public good with many agricultural 
producers that increases productivity, PARI also has an important impact on income distribution. 
Denote 't as the level of the PARI and gi as individual i's aggregate net benefits from PARI defined by a 
research production function f: 
where ~i determines each sector's per capita share of the benefits derived from the public good 
investment with ~A + ~B = 1. The second term 't/2 indicates that taxes to finance the investment t are 
shared equally by individuals. We ignore deadweight costs of taxation in raising funds for the PARI. 
Redistributive policies between sector A and B involve deadweight costs. Typical commodity 
policies in agriculture include price supports, export subsidies and trade barriers. Denote ti(t) as the 
aggregate net income transfer for individual i resulting from commodity policy t. Note that ti(O) = 0, 
and tA(t) = t and tB(t) = - t - c(t), where c(t) represents the deadweight costs of the commodity policy. 
Hence, commodity policy t represents the aggregate net income transfer to agriculture. Thus, t is 
positive when agriculture is subsidized as in industrial countries. Furthermore, we assume that Ct > 0 
for t > 0, Ct < 0 for t < 0, Ctt > 0 and c(O) = Ct(O) = 0.3 If't affects for example the supply function in 
one of the sectors, then it will affect c for a given level of the redistributive policy. This in tum will 
affect the net sector transfer { The impact ofboth policies on sector i's net income yi is given by: 
-

These assumptions are consistent with several widespread commodity policies, such as import tariffs (Swinnen and de 
Gorter, I995b). 
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Because each policy has a differential impact on the distribution of income, preference for PARI and 
the commodity policy differs between sectors. 
Tbe Social Optimum 
The optimal policies for a social planner are determined by maximizing total income. Define 
m{trn. t } as the social optimal policies which maximize national income Y = yA + yB. Maximizing 
national income implies that tm = 0 with t m determined by the following condition4 : 
which can be simplified to 
Tbe Political Optimum 
A burgeoning literature in political economy specifies a government maximizing some form of a 
political objective function (Hillman~ Alesina and Rodrik~ Persson and Tabellini~ Rausser). We 
generalize the Downsian public choice model used by Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) and Swinnen in 
analyzing redistributive policy to include PARI. The political support politicians receive from citizens 
is postulated to depend on how each policy affects the economic welfare of individuals in each group. 
Citizens increase their political support if they benefit from the policies and reduce support otherwise. 
-

Without deadweight costs (c = 0), tm is not uniquely detennined as each t yields the same Y. With deadweight costs, 
tm = 0 is the only optimum. 
4 
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Formally, individual political support Si is assumed to be a strictly concave and increasing function of 
the policy induced change in welfare V(t,t) = U(t,t) - U(O,O): 
The functions Si(.), U(.), and therefore V(.), are continuous, at least twice continuously differentiable, 
strictly increasing and strictly concave. An important advantage of this specification is that it avoids 
indeterminacy and multiple equilibria problems which are typical of deterministic (0-1) voting models 
(Mueller; Coughlin) and ofmultiple policy problems (Mayer and Riezman, 1987). We assume that Si is 
identical for all individuals, the implications ofwhich are discussed later. 
In order to stay in power, politicians need to obtain a minimum level of political support. This 
depends critically on political institutions that determine the rules of the game for political decision-
making. Under autocratic political institutions, such as dictatorships, political support from a large part 
of the constituency may not be needed to stay in power. In general, a more democratic society has 
more competition between politicians, resulting in politicians giving consideration to the impact on 
political support from their constituency. Under perfect competition, politicians will choose the policy 
combination {t*,t*} that maximizes political support in order to stay in power. For our model, this 
implies the following decision problem for politicians: 
[6]	 max S[yA(t,t)] + S[yB(t,t)] 
t, t 
• 
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subject to the government budget constraint.S We refer to the policies t* and t* that solve this 
problem as the politically optimal policies. The first order conditions for the politically optimal 
commodity policy t* and for the politically optimal public investment t* are, respectively: 
[7] Sv~t*) Uv~t*) - SvB(t*) UyB(t*) (1 + ct(t*» = 0 
[8] Sv~t*) Uv~t*) gt~t*) + SvB(t*) UyB(t*) (gtB(t*) - Ct{t*» = 0 
where Svi = oS/ovi and Uy i = ou/f}l The size and sign oft* and t* depend, inter alia, on the relative 
pre-policy endowment incomes between agriculture and industry, on the distributional impact of the 
public investment, and on the deadweight costs associated with the commodity policy. To understand 
how this model can explain the correlation between economic development and changes in the 
observed (political equilibrium) policy combinations, we first need to understand how economic 
development affects the key exogenous variables described above. 
Economic Development and Distribution of Research Benefits 
Economic development affects the distribution of the benefits from PARI in a very important 
way. De Gorter and Zilberman show that the relative values of ~i depend on the elasticity of supply 
and demand and on the effects of research on agriculture's cost structure. For example, a large cost 
reduction in agriculture due to research with an inelastic demand could have consumers benefiting more 
than farmers. We know that the richer the country, the more price inelastic is food demand because of 
the relationship between income and price elasticities given by the Coumot condition in demand theory. 
-
5	 In reality, the two policies may be decided by different parts (e.g. administrations) of the government; they may have 
different time (dynamic) effects and private research is also undertaken. To capture the essence of these features, we 
assume that agents have perfect foresight in including future costs and benefits in their valuations. Even if different 
institutions are involved in the decision-making, those institutions do not act. independently of one another as they 
take each others actions into account. Our specification is a simplified way of modelling this. 
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Furthermore, industrial countries have relatively elastic supply curves for agriculture while supply is 
extremely inelastic in developing countries (Binswanger et. at.). In this perspective, Schultz (1953) 
distinguishes the 'farm problem' in industrial countries where farmers benefit relatively less from 
technology with inelastic demand from the 'food problem' in developing countries with elastic demand. 
This implies that one would expect ~A < 0.5 in industrial countries (research favors the urban group) 
while ~A > 0.5 in developing countries (farmers benefit relatively more from research than the urban 
group). 
Impact of Changes in the Distribution of Research Benefits 
To analyze the impact of changes in the distribution of research benefits, we first assume that 
endowment incomes are equal in both sectors (y\= 'e) and that there is no commodity policy (t = 0). 
The impact of the distribution of research benefits on the political optimal research investment can be 
summarized by: 
Result 1: If the distribution of research benefits is equal (PA = PB), then support maximizing 
governments will choose the social optimal research investment (T: = T~). In the absence of 
commodity policies, inequality of research benefits causes the political optimum to always be lower 
than the social optimal PARI. The more unequal the distribution of research benefits, then a larger 
gap between the political and social optimal levels of research investment is expected 
Proof: See appendix. 
Recall that we assume each sector shares equally in financing the public good investment and that pre-
policy endowment incomes are equal. With equal distribution of research benefits, private optimum 
-

levels for research investment are identical in both sectors. Hence, a support maximizing government 
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can only lose political support by diverging from this private optimum, which is also the social 
optimum. Hence the political optimum and the political optimum coincide in the case where ~A= ~B. 
When research benefits are unequally distributed between groups, the political optimum t* will 
always be between each sector's optimum. Consider the case when industry benefits more from 
research than agriculture because of declining food prices induced by cost-reducing research. Political 
support maximizing governments will never invest more than industry's preferred level, because both 
sectors would oppose that. Furthermore, the government will always invest at least as much as 
agriculture's preferred level (because both sectors support that). 
Once the government's investment equals agriculture's private optimum, then industry will 
support a further increase, but agriculture will oppose further investment in research. An increase in 
research investment will induce a decrease in support from agriculture and an increase in support from 
industry. The political optimum is where the marginal increase in support from industry is exactly 
offset by the marginal reduction in agriculture's political support, as indicated by condition [8]. Given 
the support function as we have specified it, the political optimum will be less than the social optimum. 
The reason is what we have called the "conservative nature" of the political support function 
(Swinnen and de Gorter, 1993). Conditions [7] and [8] indicate that the marginal political support 
levels Svi play the same role in the equilibrium condition as welfare weights would play in a typical 
weighted welfare function. However, the key difference is that in our political support function, the 
"weights" are not constant, but a function of the policy level itself More specifically, with agriculture 
benefiting less than industry from PARI (~A < ~B), SvA increases and SvB decreases with t beyond 
agriculture's private optimum investment level. Therefore, the political weight of the "taxed" group ­
increases while the political weight of the group benefiting decreases when the government increases 
PARI. At some point, the marginal gain in political support from industry for the government by 
9 
increasing t is fully offset by the marginal loss in political support from agriculture. With the increasing 
"political weight" of the group benefiting least, this point will always arrive before the social optimum 
-rn is reached. This "conservative" effect is stronger when the distributional effects of research are 
larger, causing the gap between the social and political optimal investment levels to increase. 
Figure 1 illustrates this result by running several simulations6 : the social optimal investment ~ 
is always equal to 5 and is unaffected by the distributional effects of research. The politically optimal 
level of public investment t* (with t = 0) is equal to the social optimal investment -rn only when the 
research benefits are distributed equally, i.e. when agriculture gets 50% of the research benefits «(3A = 
0.5). As soon as the distribution is unequal, the political optimal level is less than the social optimum, 
and the difference increases with growing inequality of research benefits between sectors. For 
example, if agriculture gets only 100.10 of the public good benefits, t* = 3.2 if no redistribution is 
allowed (t = 0). 
Joint Policy Decision-Making and Interaction Effects 
We will now extend the analysis by including the joint determination of both the research 
investment and the redistribution through commodity policies, and their interaction effects. We first 
analyze how the distributional effects of research not only affects the politically optimal research 
investment, but also the politically optimal commodity policy. Furthermore, the endogenous 
redistribution through commodity policies induces a shift in the political optimal research investment. 
The joint determination of commodity policy and public investment generates two types of 
"interaction effects". First, there is an interaction effect between policies through how politicians make 
• 
The numbers and curves in figures 1,2,4 and 5 are based on simulations in which specific functions were used for the
 
general model developed in equations (1)-(8). All specifications are consistent with the assumptions made for the
 
general model (see Appendix A.2 for details).
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decisions with respect to changes in political support levels. Each policy affects the political support 
for the other policy, because SvA and SvB in conditions (7) and (8) are functions of both t and t, and so 
there is an incentive for politicians to change the level of the other policy. We will call this the 
"political interaction effect (PIE)". Second, public investment such as productivity increasing research 
can affect the deadweight costs of commodity policy. We define this "economic interaction effect 
(ElE)" as the change in deadweight costs per unit of transfer induced by the PARI, i.e. 0cIf7t. When 
there is no economic interaction effect, 8c/f7t = O. 
In the next section we first consider how the PIE affects the politically optimal policy 
combination while ignoring the EIE (i.e. we assume that 0cIf7t = 0). In the subsequent section, we 
study how the inclusion ofEIEs will affect the results as well. 
Tbe Impact of Political Interaction Effects (PIEs) 
The first political interaction effect is when PARI with unequal distributional effects which 
induces an endogenous redistribution (using commodity policy) from the sector which benefits 
relatively more from PARI to the sector that benefits relatively less. The level of redistribution is 
determined both by the importance of the inequality generated by PARI and the level of the PARI: 
Result 2: Agriculture is taxed if it benefits relatively more from PARI (and vice versa). 
Proof: See appendix. 
If agriculture benefits less from research (~A < ~B), then its marginal political support level will be 
higher than industry's at the politically optimal research investment. As explained above, this arises 
because a sector's marginal support increases when this group benefits less from policies, and vice­ ­
versa. Hence, the marginal support level will increase for those who are being taxed because the public 
11 
investment level is higher than their optimum. Notice that the marginal support levels are endogenous 
in the politician's decision process and will be affected by all policies. Consequently, as the ratio of 
marginal political support levels adjust with changing investment (in condition [8]), it will also affect 
the optimal redistribution levels (in condition [7]). In this case, it would imply that SvA > SvB as 
agriculture is benefiting less from research than industry. Condition [7] then implies that the 
government transfers income to agriculture (t* > 0) in this case of J3A< J3B. This result holds in general: 
the political support mechanism will induce the government to compensate the sector that benefits less 
from research by transferring income to this sector. Figure 2 shows how agriculture is subsidized when 
it gets less than 50% of the research benefits. This subsidy increases when its share declines further 
(and vice versa). 
So far we have established that the sector benefiting less from research will be compensated 
through commodity policy. The next question is: how does the commodity policy affect the politically 
optimal public investment? Is there another PIE which causes a reverse impact, i.e. does the existence 
of commodity policies affect the political optimal public investment t*? 
Result 3 : Commodity programs that allow a government to comPensate a sector that benefits less 
from public investment will increase the politically optimalpublic investment. 
Proof: see appendix 
When the government can compensate the sector which is benefiting less from PARI through the 
commodity policy t, the opposition of this sector to increasing t is mitigated. As a consequence, the 
government can increase public investment from t*(t =0) to t*(t*).7 What are the mechanisms behind • 
The fact that the new investment level is closer to the social optimal investment does not necessarily imply that the
 
social welfare increases. This is due to the fact that, at the same time when transfer t causes research investment to
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this? Assume again that agriculture is benefiting relatively less from research. Hence agriculture is 
taxed by the political optimal PARI level which is beyond its private optimum. Consequently 
agriculture has a higher marginal political support at the equilibrium investment level before the 
endogenous redistribution (i.e. with t = 0). When income is transferred from industry to agriculture 
through the endogenous redistributive policy, the marginal support levels will adjust again. The 
commodity policy benefits agriculture, whose marginal political support will therefore go down; while 
industry, which is taxed by the commodity policy, has its marginal political support go up. This 
realignment of political support will cause an increase in PARI with the initial increase in the transfer 1. 
The new equilibrium will be established with t*(t = 0) < t*(t*) :S~. This is illustrated in figure 1 with 
the DWC curves in between the t*(t = 0) and t m curves. The corresponding transfers are indicated in 
figure 2. 
The Impact of Commodity Policy Deadweight Costs 
Result 4: The stimulating effect of endogenous redistribution on PARI is negatively related to the 
distortions (per unit oftransfer) caused by the commodity policy. 
Proof: see appendix. 
Deadweight costs create a wedge between the benefits of the transfer t and the losses of the transfer 1. 
Hence, the reduction in political support from the sector which is taxed will be larger and the increase 
in political support from the gainers of the transfer will be smaller. As a consequence, the optimal 
transfer t* will be less with more distortions, and also the resulting optimal investment t*(t*) will be ­
go up, it also causes total deadweight costs to go up. The net effect depends on the inequality of the research 
distribution, on how distortionary the policy is and on the EIEs (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995b). 
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less with a more distortionary transfer policy. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how deadweight costs change 
the politically optimal policy combinations: t*(t*) varies between the social optimum level (tm = 5) and 
the t*(t = 0) level, depending on the deadweight costs associated with the transfer. With increasing 
deadweight costs, the politically optimal public investment declines and t*(t*) is closer to t*(t = 0). 
This is illustrated by the OWC2-curve which is closer to the t*(t = O)-curve than the OWCI-curve, 
with OWC2 representing higher deadweight costs per unit of transfer than OWCl. 
When non-distortionary (lump-sum) transfers can be used as a redistributive policy, the 
endogenous redistribution mechanism in our political economy framework will result in politically 
t msupport maximizing governments choosing the social optimal investment level always, i.e. t*(t*) = 
when OWC = O. The reason is that with lump-sum transfers the government can use the transfer as a 
perfect compensation mechanism, allowing for full compensation of the distributional effects of public 
research. Hence, research policy induced inequality will be fully compensated by the endogenous 
redistribution. The result is that the reduction in political support which would occur from investing 
more than a sector's optimum is fully offset by the increase in political support by increased transfers to 
t mthis sector, leading to the unchanged optimum t*(t*) = for the government, regardless of the 
distributional effects. In summary: 
Result 5: With non-distortionary transfer policies the political support maximizing government will 
choose the social optimal level ofpublic investment. 8 In all other cases (DWC > 0) the gap 
between political and social optimal research investment increases with growing inequality of 
research benefits - even with endogenous redistribution. 
-

8 This result is conditional on the static nature of the analysis. In a dynamic framework underinvestment will result 
even without owe because of government credibility problems in compensation (Swinnen and de Gorter, I995a). 
14 
Proof: see appendix 
Implications for Policy Instrument Choice and Economic Development 
The extreme ends of economic development results in large unequal distribution of research 
benefits (Figure 2). The result is a demand and hence a supply of redistributive policies in the form of 
distortionary commodity policy (tax farmers in poor countries and subsidize farmers in rich countries). 
The transfer policy induces deadweight costs, something rich countries can better afford on a relative 
basis than their poor country counterparts. Furthermore, the deadweight costs differ between various 
policy instruments, and hence the benefits of policy reform (i.e. the shift to a less distortionary 
commodity policy) increase as well, both in terms of reduced deadweight costs and in terms of more 
PARI which is now possible with a less distortionary commodity policy. 
Typical policy reforms in the past involve important costs in adjusting administration, human 
capital, institutions and the like. Figure 1 indicates that as the extreme ends of economic development 
coincides with a large inequality in research benefits, the benefits of policy reform are also large and 
may outweigh the political costs of policy reform at some point. A classic example is the growth of 
agricultural production in European Union over the past 50 years whereby increased productivity has 
shifted agriculture into a net exporter position. This increases the deadweight cost per unit transfer 
because the international terms of trade deteriorate as subsidies increase. Likewise, farm structure has 
changed such that relative rural-urban incomes have increased in several countries. The result is 
political pressure for policy reform. 
In the European Union's case, import tariffs improved their terms of trade in the early years and 
-

so subsidies involved relatively low deadweight costs (and bypassed public budget expenditures). 
Technical change (induced in part by PARI in European Union and world-wide) caused a huge increase 
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in subsidy costs, thereby generating a change in policy instruments. First, import tariffs were replaced 
by import and production quotas (along with other quantitative restrictions on the amount receiving 
subsidies like 'maximum guaranteed quantities'). Now price supports are being reduced and the 
quantity receiving payments are being increasingly separated from the level of production. So unequal 
benefits of research early on induced more transfers but the costs of the transfers resulted in more 
efficient and modest transfer or commodity policy. The benefits from research reached the public in 
this endogenous policy world, with commodity policy first compensating for technical change and 
inducing more PARI than otherwise would have been the case. 
The Impact of Economic Interaction Effects 
Economic interaction effects (EIEs) occur if the PARI affects the deadweight cost of commodity 
policy, i.e. OcIfTt ::I; O. Now there is an additional effect affecting the income distribution of the PARI 
and thus the political equilibrium PARI level (as indicated by equation (8». The impact of the PARI on 
deadweight costs of commodity policy is widely discussed in the literature with most papers arguing 
that the PARI increases deadweight costs (Alston, Edwards and Freebaim; Murphy, Furtan and 
Schmitz; Chambers and Lopez). However, these conclusions are based on the assumption of a given 
policy instrument level, e.g. a fixed import tariff or production subsidy. Of course, with a cost­
reducing research induced supply shift, both producers' incomes and transfers to producers increase 
with a fixed policy instrument level. Hence, results based on this assumption are irrelevant for our 
current analysis. We need to know how PARI affects the deadweight costs of commodity policies per 
unit of transfer (or for a fixed transfer level) i.e. OcIfTt. In general, the impact depends on the 
• 
commodity policy instrument, on the trade status of the sector and on the nature of the research 
induced supply shift. However, for a parallel supply shift, which is. argued to be the most relevant 
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case9, virtually all policy-trade status cases yield a negative impact of research on the per unit transfer 
deadweight costs, i.e. EIE =OcIiJt < 0 (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995b). 
To illustrate this effect, consider the impact of productivity increasing public investment on an 
import tariff in a small country with a simple, partial equilibrium model (see figure 3). Agricultural 
producers are protected as world market price pW is below the domestic price pt(O), which is sustained 
by an import tariff equal to pt(O) - Pw. The demand and supply curves are represented by D and S(O), 
respectively. Domestic consumption is Qd(O) and supply is at QS(O). The net transfer to the 
agricultural sector t induced by the import tariff pt(O) - Pw equals area ABED. Deadweight costs 
associated with transfer t, c(O), equal the sum of areas BIE and NKM. Now assume that the PARI t 
shifts the supply curve from S(O) to S(t). What happens to deadweight costs? Notice that the shift of 
the supply curve would induce an increase in transfer t if the import tariff is maintained at pt(O) _ Pw. 
However, as our analysis is ceteris paribus, we need to separate the effects of both policies. To 
analyze the impact of t on c, we need to keep t constant. In order to keep transfer t constant, the 
import tariff has to decline to pt(t) - pW with public investment t. Domestic prices fall from pt(O) to 
pt(t). Consumption and production both increase to Qd(t) and QS(t), respectively. Deadweight costs 
c{t) equal the sum of areas FJH and RLM. It is evident from figure 3 that c{t) < c(O): hence l!icll!it < O. 
In the case when EIE < 0, the benefits for sector B of public research investments increase, 
because for a given PARI level to, sector B's income is now Y'tB(to) = 8tB(to) - ~(tO). Hence a 
negative EIE (OcIiJt < 0) reduces existing deadweight costs and hence, increases B's income. 
-

Therefore, this will either reduce sector B's opposition to further public research investment (when f3A 
Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz cite a series of studies which show that a parallel shift is more consistent with empirical 9 
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> ~B), or will increase B's support for more PARI (when ~A < ~B). In both cases, condition (8) 
indicates that EIE < 0 will yield an increase in the optimal level 't* .10 The implication is that 
governments will tend to increase public investment further when commodity policies are used for 
compensation, because the EIEs ensure that the public investment has a negative effect on deadweight 
costs per unit of transfer. Figure 1 shows how t*(t*) increases with EIE < 0 and comes closer to the t 
= 5 line. This effect will be larger with a more negative EIE effect. To summarize, for most 
commodity policies, economic interaction effects (ElEs) reduce deadweight costs per unit of transfer 
and increase the political optimal research investment levels. 
The Impact of Endowment Income Differences 
In many countries with economic development, other forces affect relative rural-urban incomes 
in addition to the levels of PARI such as farm structure, climate, land endowments and the like. We 
depict these other factors as "endowment income" differentials reflected in y\;'c. Endowment 
income differentials affect the politically optimal policy combination because they change the relative 
welfare effects of the policies. Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) show that when one sector's income falls 
below the other sector's income, an endogenous redistribution scheme to partially compensate this 
exogenously induced income gap is politically optimal. This result still holds in a two-policy 
framework: at*/8y\ < 0, independent of the PARI income distribution effects. ll The intuition is as 
follows: ifagriculture's endowment income falls, then farmers will experience a larger marginal change 
in utility induced by a given transfer 1. Consequently, farmers' per capita political reaction will be 
studies. 
-

10 The opposite will hold when EIE > 0, which can occur under the combination of a pivotal research induced supply 
shift and a very distortionary commodity policy. 
11 A proof can be obtained from the authors. 
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larger than that of an individual in sector B. Politicians can increase total support by redistributing 
income to the sector that experiences a decrease in relative endowment income. The reduction is 
support from the high income sector is more than offset by the gain in support from the lower per 
capita income sector. 
The net transfer t* will now depend on the combination ofboth income differences (endowment 
and research induced) which may either reinforce or offset one another. For example, figure 4 shows 
that redistribution to agriculture (t*) still declines with the share ofagriculture in research benefits (~A) 
increasing, but that the level of redistribution is affected by the relative income level as well. An 
increase in ~A will require less subsidies for agriculture (or more taxation to compensate industry). 
With ~e = -Ie, the benefits share at which t* = 0 is, of course, when ~A = ~B. But with agriculture 
having 400!cl higher income, taxation of agriculture starts when agriculture gets more than 300!cl of the 
research benefits. 
Changes in relative endowment incomes will also affect the politically optimal PARI level. 
More specifically, a lower endowment income for a group will increase (decrease) research 
expenditures if the group benefits more (less) from research. The sign of 8t* loy\ depends on the 
distribution of research benefits between agriculture and the rest of the economy. If agriculture 
benefits less than the rest of the economy from research investment (~A < 50%), then there is a positive 
impact of an increase in farmers' endowment income on equilibrium research investment t*: 8t* loy\ 
> 0 with ~A < ~B (and vice versa). This is reflected in the upward shift of the t*(t*) curve in figure 5 
for ~A < 50% with ~J-Ie increasing with 400!cl (i.e. from 1.0 to 1.4). The intuition behind this result is 
that when the research benefits are distributed unequal and when income transfers through commodity ­
policies induce deadweight costs, the government will also use the research investment policy for 
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redistributive purposes. If industry benefits more from research than agriculture, the government will 
compensate industry for a relative decrease in their endowment incomes by a combination of increasing 
research expenditures and by increasing transfers to them. Because research benefits industry relative 
more, politicians find it convenient to use this (non-distortionary) policy for compensating exogenous 
changes in income. Hence, politically optimal research investment will increase in this case. This may 
result in the politically optimal research investment being higher than the social optimal (i.e. 
"overinvestment"). Figure 5 illustrates this case: with pA = 40% and agriculture's endowment income 
40% higher, politically optimal research investment equals 5.12, which is more than the social optimum 
(= 5). 
This overinvestment in research for compensation occurs up to the point when the endowment 
income difference and the research benefits distribution effect exactly offset one another. In the case 
when y\ =14 and 'c= 10, figures 4 and 5 show that this offsetting point occurs when pA =30%. At 
this point there is no redistribution (t* = 0). When agriculture gets even less of the benefits (pA < 
30%), the political demand for compensation becomes stronger than the (opposite) demand for 
compensating the endowment income effects. As a result, agriculture is subsidized (t* > 0) and we 
observe underinvestment again (t* < t m = 5). 
While this overinvestment is limited to the 30% < pA < 50% interval, the politically 
optimal PARI with ~Jlc= 1.4 is higher than when endowment incomes are equal (~Jlc= 1.0) 
as long as pA < 50%. The opposite happens when farmers have higher endowment incomes and 
benefit more from research. In this case, industry demands compensation for both lower 
endowment incomes and less research benefits. The endogenous increase in taxation of 
-

agriculture and the associated deadweight costs, reduce the politically optimal research 
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investment. This is illustrated in figure 5, which shows how the t*(y\/'!c = 1A)-curve is higher 
than the t*(fJ'!c= 1.0)-curve for ~A > 50%. 
In summary, when the endowment and research income distributional effects reinforce one 
another, they cause a decline in political optimal PARI t* and an increase in the optimal transfer 
t* . When the two effects mitigate one another, t* increases and t* declines. 12 Whether t* is 
larger or smaller than 'f' and the sign of t* depends on the relative importance of both effects, 
itselfdetermined by other exogenous factors, including the structure of the economy. 
Implications for the Endogenous Growth Literature 
Our results can contribute to the understanding of several results in the growing literature on 
endogenous policy that emphasize links between income distribution and economic growth (persson 
and Tabellini 1992, 1994~ Alesina and Perotti~ and Alesina and Rodrik). These studies argue that 
inequality harms growth because it induces redistribution which in tum reduces growth promoting 
investments by the private sector. Although empirical analysis confirms the strong link between 
equality and growth, the specific role of policies are not analyzed. Both Persson and Tabellini (I992) 
and Alesina and Perotti emphasize the need for future research to identify more explicitly the link 
between income distribution and policy and the link between policy and growth. 
Our paper focuses explicitly on policy choices in an endogenous policy framework and includes 
both policies of redistribution and public good investments. We have derived how inequality affects the 
political equilibrium level of redistribution and public good investment. Assuming that more 
redistribution reduces aggregate economic growth through its inherent deadweight costs while public 
good investments stimulates growth, our model provides an explanation for 3 key observations -
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forwarded in Persson and Tabellini (1994): (1) a strong negative relation between inequality and 
growth, (2) a weak positive relation between inequality and redistribution, and (3) a weak negative 
effect of redistribution on growth. 
Our model shows how redistribution is induced by inequality. However, the existence of public 
good investments as a second policy complicates the relationship as to how inequality affects 
redistribution. Public good investments are an additional (endogenous) source of inequality, even 
though growth is induced. An increase in either exogenous (endowment) or endogenous inequality 
generates a political need for redistribution which results in more deadweight costs. Therefore, public 
good investments and redistribution will depend on both endowment income inequality and on the 
distributional effects of the public good investment. Let us consider both possible cases in order to 
show the effects of inequality on endogenous policy choices and on growth (see figure 6 for a 
schematic summary of our arguments below) 
Case 1: if the public good investment reduces inequality (offsets endowment income inequality), then 
public good investments are higher, and redistribution is lower than otherwise. In this case, public 
good investments reduce the need for redistribution while the income distribution effects of the public 
good induces governments to increase investments in public goods. We therefore expect a strong 
positive relationship between post-policy (observed) equality and growth (as observed in Persson and 
Tabellini, (1994). 
Case 2: if the public good investment increases inequality (exacerbates endowment inequality), then 
public good investments are lower, and redistribution is higher than otherwise. In this case, inequality 
-

increases with public good investments, thereby increasing redistribution and hence tempering growth. 
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Public good investments are lower than otherwise, generating a negative relationship between 
inequality (both pre-policy and post-policy inequality) and growth. 
Our analysis provides a qualified explanation for the endogenous policy literature's major 
proposition on the strong negative relationship between inequality and growth. In case 1, inequality in 
pre-policy endowment incomes can be offset by the distributional effects of public good investments 
such that there is no negative relationship between pre-policy inequality and growth. Pre-policy or 
exogenous inequality is offset by public good investments such that one gets a strong positive 
relationship between post-policy equality and growth. On the other hand, both pre-policy and post­
policy inequality are negatively related to growth in case 2. 
It is important to distinguish between exogenous endowment inequality from the endogenous 
income distributional effects of public good investments. Public good investments are an integral part 
of the political decision making in our model with important interactions with redistributive policy. In 
addition to the income distribution effects, politicians balance the political benefits of increasing the 
social pie with public good investments with the deadweight costs due to redistribution. Redistribution 
can moderate inequality induced by public good investments, thereby allowing for more public good 
investments (provided the interaction effects between the two policies in increasing deadweight costs 
are not too severe; see de Gorter, Nielson and Rausser; and Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995b). We 
argue that the strong positive relationship between equality and growth reported by the endogenous 
policy literature includes the effect of both redistribution and public good investment policies. 
Redistributive policy reduces inequality due to differentials in either endowment incomes or in 
distributional effects of public good investments, thereby inducing governments to provide more public • 
goods. It is even possible that the income distribution effects of public good investments offsets 
inequality in endowment incomes, thereby reducing the need for redistribution. In our political model, 
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the costs of redistribution (to reduce inequality in either endowment incomes or differential income 
effects of public good investments) is balanced by politicians against the economic gains of the now 
more politically acceptable public good investments. 13 
Furthennore, our model provides an explanation for why Persson and Tabellini (1994) find a 
weak negative effect of redistribution on growth (see their discussion of Table 8). If inequality 
decreases with the public good investment (case 1), then the growth-promoting public good investment 
generates a decrease in redistribution. This is consistent with a negative association between growth 
and redistribution. However, our explanation as to their weak negative effect of redistribution on 
growth is that when inequality increases with public good investments (case 2) redistribution increases 
to moderate inequality, allowing governments to take advantage of growth generated by the public 
good investment. This reverse effect of growth on redistribution (induced by the public good's effect 
on inequality and hence on redistribution) may explain why Persson and Tabellini (1994) obtain a weak 
negative effect of redistribution on growth over the entire dataset (which covers both cases 
presumably). Despite the growth reducing increase in redistribution due to the public good, the public 
good investment itself has a direct positive effect on growth. Governments still make public good 
investments even if it exacerbates inequality (although investments are lower than otherwise) because 
redistribution is a policy option to partially offset political opposition. 
Finally, the weak positive effect inequality on redistribution concluded by Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) may be explained by the fact that they do not directly measure either the pre-policy endowment 
: inequality or the income distributional effects of public good investments. Instead, they have only one 
•13	 This is analogous to the argument made by Alesina and Perotti that redistributive policies targeted to reduce 
inequality may increase economic growth: "fiscal transfers may be beneficial if the fiscal burden of the transfers is 
compensated by the gain in social bannony" (p. 2). In our paper, government's gain political support by using 
redistributive policy, allowing for more public good investments. 
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policy instrument and evaluate aggregate post-policy (or observed) inequality. This may explain why 
they find a weak positive effect of inequality on redistribution. 
Conclusions 
Stylized facts on government policies in agriculture are (a) that industrial countries subsidize 
agriculture, while developing countries tax farmers, with negative efficiency effects on domestic and 
international markets; and (b) that underinvestment in public agricultural research investment (pARI) 
prevails in both developing and industrial countries, despite evidence that PARI is an important source 
of productivity growth in agriculture and of social income in general. 
This paper presents an explanation for these stylized facts. We show that a political support 
maximizing government will invest less than the social optimum when research benefits are unequal. 
Furthermore, due to political interaction effects between both policies, governments will tax agriculture 
when agriculture gets most of the benefits from research and subsidizes agriculture when agriculture 
gets only a small share of the benefits from research. Conversely, this endogenous redistribution 
induces a reduction in opposition to the reforms, which increases political optimal level of PARI. 
However in the presence of deadweight costs, underinvestment will remain. Similarly, changes in 
deadweight costs per unit of transfer caused by the research policy will only change the extent of 
underinvestment. 
Combining these conclusions with the insights that economic development changes the relative 
benefits from agricultural research, and more specifically that agriculture benefits increasingly less from 
research with economic growth, this model provides an explanation of why agriculture is increasingly 
subsidized when the economy grows and that underinvestment is observed in both developing and ­
industrial countries. 
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In the last section we show how other (non-policy) sources of income inequality affect the 
political outcome. We conclude that when both sources of inequality are in the same direction, our 
conclusions are reinforced. When the sources of inequality are offsetting, the results may change and 
that, in some cases, overinvestment may result as political support maximizing governments are 
induced to use PARI for distributive purposes as well. Finally, we offer several insights from our 
model which may explain observations from the emerging literature on the political economy of 
endogenous growth. 
-
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APPENDIX A.I 
Proof of Result I 
To show (with y\ = I c and t = 0): 
(a) t* = i" for ~A = ~B, 
(b) t* < i" for ~A:I; ~B, 
(c) Ot*/O~A > 0 for ~A < ~B and Ot*/O~A < 0 for ~A > ~B. 
Proof: 
(a) with t=O and ~A = ~B, U/(t*)=UyB(t*) and SvA(t*)=SvB(t*), implying that y/(t*)+Y-rB(t*)=l. 
Using condition (3) this implies that t* = t m. Q.E.D. 
(b) Define k(t)=(SvA(t)U/(t))/(SvB(t)UyB(t)) and the right hand side as z(t)= - Y-rB(t)/y/(t). It 
follows that z(tm)=l always, but k(tm)=l only iff~A = ~B. Furthermore, with ~A > ~B: k(tm)<l, 0 
k(t)/Ot <0 and &(t)/Ot >0 (and vice versa for ~A < ~B). This implies that t* < t mfor ~A :I; ~B. 
Q.E.D. 
(c) Denote equilibrium condition (8) as G(t*,~i) == O. Then we can derive
 
Ot*/O~A = - Gp/G-r
 
where
 
Gp = (HA y/ - HBY-rB) f{t) + 8-r
 
G-r= HA(y-rAi - HB(y-rBi + 8n
 
B B8-r = (SvAU/ - Sv Uy ) t(t)
 
8~= (~AU/ ~A _ ~B U"B ~B) fn(t)
 
lHI = Svl(Uyl i + (Svl Uyy ) 
Given the concavity assumptions, it follows that If < 0 and that 8n < 0, which implies that G-r < 0 
always. Furthermore, 8-r <,=,> 0 and Gp >,=,< 0 for ~A <,=,> ~B. Combining this yields that Ot*/ 
O~A >,=,< 0 for ~A <,=,> ~B. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Result 2 
To show (with ~c= Ic): Ot*/O~A < 0 . 
Proof: 
Now consider the joint optimization oft* and t*. To formally derive the effects ofchanges in key 
. structural variables on the policy combination, let 
• R (t*,t*, ~i, -Ic, x) == 0 ­
G (t*,t*, ~i, -Ic, x) == 0 
represent conditions (7) and (8), respectively. 
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Vector x represents a set ofadditional exogenous variables that affect the equilibrium policies.
 
From this system of equations, we can derive the impact of these exogenous variables on both t*
 
and t*. Applying Cramer's rule and the implicit function rule,it follows that
 
at*IO~A= - (RpG~- ~Gp) I <RtGl-RGt)
 
where
 
Ry = ORIay\, Rt= ORIat*, R~= ORIfJt*, Gy = OGlfJy\, Gt = OGlat*, G~= OGlfJt*,
 
Rp= (HA + HB (I + Ct» tl~) < 0,
 
Gp=(HY~ - HBt~) tl~) + a~,
 
with Gp < 0 for t*< 0 and ~A> ~B and Gp > 0 for t* > 0 and ~A< ~B.
 
Define denominator D = RtGl-RGt , which can be rewritten as D = anR l - auG ~ + 2a nR~
 
where
 
R I =H
A+HB(I+C I )2 -au <0
 
G~=HA(y~)2+HB(y~)2+an. <0 
R t =HAy~ -HB(I+CI)y~ -an 
a n = (SAUAr:tv y.... A+ SBUBr:tB)fv y.... n < 0 
au = S~U:Cu > 0
 
at! = S~U:ct!
 
and au >,=,< 0 for Cu >,=,< O.
 
Further, R t > 0 for ~A < ~B and Ct! ~ 0, and R t < 0 for ~A > ~B and Ct! ~ O.
 
Denominator D is affected by three distinct factors. 
The first term (atRt) reflects the PIE, i.e. how changes in one government policy (t or 1) 
affect the endogenous "weights" of the two sectors in the governments' derived preference 
function, and thus the political equilibrium of both policies. This term is always positive, given 
our assumptions and Rt < o. 
The second term (-8ttGt) represents the deadweight costs of the transfer policy (t). This 
term is also positive (with Gt < 0) unless there are no deadweight costs (Cu = 0) in which case the 
term becomes zero. 
The last term (2anRt) represents the EIE: with en = 0 it disappears and D > O. IfEIEs are 
present, the sign depends both on the sign of en and on the distribution of research benefits: e.g. 
the term will be negative if en < 0 and ~A < ~B. In general, it tends to mitigate the first two terms, 
but in principle it could enforce them as well. This might be possible with a very distortive 
intervention instrument in industrial countries (~ > 0 and ~A < ~B). In fact, one could argue that 
the combinations which make the third term positive are less probable combinations: a very 
distortive instrument (en > 0) in LDCs (~A > ~B); or a less distortive instrument (en < 0) in rich 
countries (~A < ~B). . 
. 
! 
r·· 
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Define numerator N = RpGt- RtGp , which can be rewritten as N = -enRp + atRt - anGp 
where 
at = (SAVU\ - SBV UBy) f~t) 
and at = 0 when c (.) = 0, and at >, =, < 0 for t* >, =, < 0 when c(t) >0. 
Without deadweight costs, both at and an are zero, which implies that at* /O~A = -Rp / Rt < 0 with 
Rp< 0 and Rt< o. 
With deadweight costs, the effect becomes more complicated as both the numerator and 
denominator have additional terms, all of which are conditional on the structure of research 
benefits and the level of subsidization. With deadweight costs present, at depends on the net 
transfer (reflecting the relative impact of the endowment income difference and the differential 
research impact): at >,=,< 0 for t* >,=,< O. Further, Rt >,= < 0 for ~A<,=, > ~A. Using these 
results, it follows that, without EIEs, at*/ O~A < 0 for ~A ~ ~B and t* > 0, and, for ~A ~ ~B and t* 
~ O. With y\= '!C these combinations cover the whole domain. Therefore: at*/O~A < O. 
With EIEs > 0, at*/O~A < 0, because the third term ofN enforces the other terms' impact. 
With EIE < 0, the third term ofN mitigates the other terms' impact. The aggregate effect cannot 
be derived conclusively without imposing specific functional forms on the terms. The simulations 
in the graphs illustrate the intuitive result that economic interaction effects enforce this when they 
are positive (EIEs > 0) and mitigate this when they are negative (EIES < 0), but in all our 
simulations the EIE effect never overtook the DWe effect and the distributional effect, such that 
at*/O~A < 0 for y\= '!C also with EIE < 0 in the simulations. 
Proof of Results 3 and 4 
To show (with ~c= '!c): t*(t=O) ~ t*(t*) ~ t m 
Proof:
 
Analogous to Proof 1(b) define k(t,t)=(S/(t,t)U/(t,t»/(SvB(t,t)UyB(t,t» and z(t) = - YtB(t)/y/(t
 
). Notice that z(t) is unaffected by the transfer t. Independent of the PARI distributional effects,
 
ok(t,t)/at < 0 and we know from Proof 1(b) that ok(t,t)/8t > 0 for ~A < ~B. In this case that ~A <
 
~B, this implies that t*(t=O) ~ t m(Result 1) and that a transfers from sector B to A will be induced
 
(t*>o (Result 2». With ok(t,t)/at and ok(t,t)/8t as derived above, this implies that t*(t=O) < t
 
*(t*). But, with z(tm)=l, t*(t*) = ~ only ifk(t*,t*)=l. This would imply full compensation, i.e.
 
,!(t*,t*) = ~(t*,t*), implying that SvA(t*,t*) = SvB(t*,t*) and U/(t*,t*) = UyB(t*,t*).
 
. However, this can only occur if c(t*) = Ct(t*) = 0; otherwise: t*(t*) <~. With more
• 
­distortionary transfers, c(t*) and Ct(t*) will be larger, and hence create a larger gap between ,!(t*, 
t*) and ~(t*, t*), and thus between t*(t*) and~. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Result 5 
To show (with ofe = 'e): 
(a) t·(t·) = ~ iff c(t·) = Ct(t·) = 0; 
(b) Ot·(t·)/O~A > 0 for ~A < ~B (and vice versa). 
Proof: 
(a) see proof of results 3 and 4. 
(b) Analogous to the derivations in the proof ofResult 2, we can derive that
 
Ot·(t·)/O~A= - <RtGp- RpGt) / D, which can be rewritten as :
 
Ot·(t·)/O~A =(anGp - a~Rt - anRp) / D
 
where D is the same denominator as in Ot·/O~A in the proof ofResult 2.
 
Without deadweight costs all these tenns are zero (a tt = a~ = an = 0) and, thus, Ot·/O~A = O. This 
implies that, in the absence ofdeadweight costs, there is no effect of the share of research benefits 
on the politically optimal research investment t·. 
With deadweight costs, but without EIEs, the third tenn (- anRp) is still zero, but the first two no 
longer. This implies that Ot·(t·)/O~A =(anGp - a~Rt) / D. We showed earlier that denominator D 
is positive. The sign of the numerator depends on the distribution of the benefits and the level of 
the transfer t· (which itself depends on the relative research benefits, given that endowment 
incomes are equal). With ~A < ~B and, thus, t· > 0, Gp > 0 and a~ >0. This implies, with au > 0 
and Rt < 0 always, that Ot·(t·)/O~A > 0 for ~A < ~. Inversely, with Gp < 0 and a~ < 0 for ~A > ~B 
and t· < 0, it follows that Ot.(t.)/O~A < 0 for ~A > ~B. 
As in the proof of Result 2, with EIEs > 0, Ot·(t·)/O~A > 0 for ~A < ~, because the third 
tenn of the nominator (- anRp) enforces the other tenns' impact. With EIE < 0, the third tenn 
mitigates the other tenns' impact. Again, the aggregate effect cannot be derived conclusively 
without imposing specific functional fonns on the tenns. The simulations in the graphs illustrate 
the intuitive result that economic interaction effects enforce this when they are positive (EIEs > 0) 
and mitigate this when they are negative (EIES < 0), but in all our simulations the EIE effect 
never overtook the DWe effect and the distributional effect, such that Ot·(t·)/O~A > 0 for ~A < ~ 
with ofe = 'e also with EIE < 0 in the simulations. 
. 
, ­
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A.2 Simulation Model Details 
The following functional forms were used for the simulations ofsocial and politically optimal policies: 
vi =U(yi) = 2*yi - 0.OS*(yi)2
 
Si = S(vi) = 2*vi - 0.OS*(vi)2

.. . 
VI =lJl(t,t) - lJl(O,O)
 
f{t) =2*t - 0.1*(t)2
 
c(t,t) =h * t2 /[l+f{t~], with h andj varying.
 
With h > °and j = 0, 1 or 2, c(t,t) behaves consistent with the assumptions on the general deadweight 
cost function in the paper (see section The Model). 
.
• 
­
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Figure 3: Impact of public investment on deadweight costs of an import tarifT 
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Figure 4: Endowment Incomes, Distribution of Research Benefits and Politically Optimal 
Transfer t* 
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Figure 6: Inequality, public good investment, redistribution and growth 
Case J: Public good investment offsets endowment inequality 
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